Wallingford/Jarlov Family Trees

U.S. World War II Army Enlistment Records, 1938-1946
about Wallace L Page
Name: Wallace L Page
Birth Year: 1919
Race: White, Citizen (White)
Nativity State or Country: Texas
State of Residence: Texas
County or City: Harris

Enlistment Date: 11 Mar 1943
Enlistment State: Texas
Enlistment City: Houston
Branch: Air Corps
Branch Code: Air Corps
Grade: Private
Grade Code: Private
Component: Reserves - exclusive of Regular Army Reserve and Officers of the Officers Reserve Corps on active duty under the Thomason Act (Officers and Enlisted Men -- O.R.C. and E.R.C., and Nurses-Reserve Status)
Source: Enlisted Reserve or Medical Administrative Corps (MAC) Officer

Education: 4 years of high school
Height: 00
Weight: 000

From http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/194/974/460704/

Memorandum from the District Court in the original action, reported in a later appeal:

'The plane was designated as a Type T-7 in the Air Force nomenclature, being a two-engine Beechcraft. With Captain Wallace L. Page as pilot, Lieutenant Rodney J. Alsup, co-pilot, and with Chapman and three other passengers, the plane took off from Ellington Field at about 12:30 P.M. Prior to take-off, the pilot had filed his flight plan, received his briefing on the weather conditions which he might encounter, and received a Visual Flight Rules clearance to New Orleans.

'The flight was uneventual until the plane reached the area of Baton Rouge. At 2:37 P.M., by radio the pilot contacted the New Orleans station and reported that he was fifteen miles south of Baton Rouge at 2,000 feet, was encountering bad weather and overcast, and requested that his Visual Flight Rules clearance be changed to Instrument Flight Rules clearance covering the remainder of the flight. Five minutes later the New Orleans station gave this permission. At 3:11 P.M., the pilot again reported by radio that he was approximately ten miles out of New Orleans and unable to determine his position, and that his radio receiver was not operating. Immediately thereafter, the New Orleans station instructed the pilot to advise the amount of fuel aboard and whether he desired that another suitable landing field be selected where better weather conditions prevailed. This message was not acknowledged by the plane and apparently was not received. At 3:13 P.M., the pilot radioed that he had found a hole in the overcast and was descending. At 3:24 P.M., he radioed that he was at 750 feet, that one engine was not operating, that he was in emergency and would land at the first field available. On receipt of this message, the New Orleans station alerted all other fields in the vicinity, had them clear their traffic and stand by. At 3:32 P.M., the pilot reported that he was coming down the edge of Lake Pontchartrain with one engine out and the remaining engine running rough. A notation attached to this message- apparently made by the New Orleans radio operator who received it- noted that the first field would probably be the Navy Auxiliary Field. At about this moment, the training officer of the Naval Air Station at New Orleans observed the plane about a mile to the west. It was flying at approximately 200 feet altitude and was proceeding in an easterly direction. This officer immediately contacted the control tower at the Navy Field, instructed the radio operator to try to contact the aircraft, and to make the field available. A green light was flashed as a signal to the plane that it might land. The plane proceeded past the Naval Air Station at a distance of approximately one-half mile without acknowledging the green light, and approached the New Orleans Airport, which is located approximately two miles beyond the Navy Field. As the plane approached the New Orleans Airport, it was lined up with one of the runways, and the airport flashed a green light giving permission to land immediately. This was not acknowledged by the aircraft. The pilot instead executed a right turn, apparently for the purpose of aligning with another runway, and a green light again was directed to the aircraft, giving permission to land on this second runway. This signal was acknowledged by the plane's blinking its landing lights. The plane then attempted to execute a left turn to come into proper alignment, and began to lower its landing gear. At this point it spun into the ground, crashed, and burned.

'As to the Plaintiffs' allegation that the pilot was not adequately briefed upon the weather, and, in view of the possibility of encountering turbulence, should have been given a visual clearance only to Baton Rouge and an instrument clearance thence to New Orleans, the evidence shows that for some forty-eight hours prior to the inception of the flight, a 'front' or weather disturbance had been lying practically stationary some miles in the Gulf off the Louisiana Coast. It was known that this turbulence might move inland at any time, but at the time of take-off there was no indication that such movement was imminent. While no witness who testified could state from independent recollection just what information had been given the pilot, the evidence does indicate that he was given the benefit of all weather information then available. The pilot certified prior to take-off, 'I have been adequately briefed on the current and forecast weather affecting my flight, and I understand the weather situation.' Certainly there is no evidence that any information available to the weather office was withheld from the pilot or that the briefing officers were negligent.

'As to authorizing a visual clearance for the entire trip, if there be any improper judgment exercised there (which I doubt, in view of the weather information then available), the error was rectified long prior to the time that the plane experienced any difficulty, for, as stated, the pilot changed his flight plan by radio contact with ground stations at or near Baton Rouge, with the same result as though the flight plan had been issued originally in the form which Plaintiffs contend it should have been. Issuing the plan in its original form could not have been a proximate cause of the accident.

'The records of the Army Air Force received in evidence indicate that the pilot had some 800 hours experience and was qualified to fly the type aircraft involved. There is no proof whatsoever that he was known to be a reckless or unskilled flyer. I can find no negligence in permitting him to pilot the plane.

'In their argument and brief, Plaintiffs stress particularly the alleged negligence of the pilot in failing to land at the Naval Auxiliary Field, and in failing to come in directly for a landing at the New Orleans airport upon the runway with which his plane originally was aligned. The pilot's conduct in attempting to make the maneuvers which he did and in attempting to land on the other runway gives me more concern than any other allegations of negligence, but on mature consideration, I cannot and do not find that this was negligence. Under the weather conditions then prevailing, it may well have been that he did not see the green lights which originally were directed toward his plane; or for reasons to us unknown the course which he pursued may at the moment have seemed, and in, fact, been the more reasonable and intelligent plan to follow. The fact that he was aware of the danger and expected to do everything possible to land the plane quickly and safely is indicated from his radio messages. While in retrospect it may appear that some other course might have been more feasible, the proof before me does not show by a preponderance of the evidence any negligence on the part of the pilot.

'In support of their contention of negligence on the part of the pilot, the Plaintiffs offered in evidence the report of a Board of Air Force Officers appointed September 22, 1948, to investigate the accident and its causes. This consists of a number of documents, bound together, and constitutes a file maintained by the Directorate of Flight Safety Research. It includes an Air Force form styled 'Report of Major Accident' which contains a recitation of the flight and its disasterous result, together with the conclusions of the Board of Officers as to the cause of the crash; copies of various reports maintained on the airplane for some time prior to the flight; certified copy of the release hereinafter referred to, and several unsworn statements of witnesses. Apparently this Board of Officers considered the information presented in the Air Force reports and in the statements of witnesses, and its own report reconstructed the flight and gave its opinion as to the cause thereof. In the opinion of the Board, the crash resulted from the exercise of poor judgment on the part of the pilot in not landing at the Naval Air Station or upon the runway of the New Orleans airport with which the plane originally was aligned. The Defendant objected to the introduction of this entire report on the ground that it consisted only of opinions and conclusions of the Officers of the Board, based entirely on hearsay statements and data before such Board. The Plaintiffs contend that the entire report is admissible under the terms of Section 1732 of Title 28 U.S.C.A., citing Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 3rd Cir., 183 F.2d 467. While certain language in that opinion tends to support the Plaintiffs' contention, I think that Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 63 S.Ct. 477, 87 L.Ed. 645, 144 A.L.R. 719, and the annotation thereof at p. 727, establishes a contrary rule. For the reasons there cited, I hold the report inadmissible.'